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In addition to imposing a no-fly zone, Resolution 1973 demands a cease-fire and a "complete end to violence and all attacks against, and abuses of, civilians." Among the various measures sanctioned to achieve this latter aim, the Security Council granted member states permission to "take all necessary measures . . . to protect civilians and civilian populated areas under threat of attack." The Resolution thus authorizes direct military action against Libyan armed and security forces in response to any operations that are placing, or might place, the civilian population at risk. Such permission is indispensable to protecting civilians, for the greatest threat to civilians comes not from air attacks, but rather ground attacks directed against them or in which they might become collateral damage. Two days after adoption of Resolution 1973, an ad hoc coalition of forces launched combat operations to enforce the zone and to obstruct the Libyan ground attacks that were endangering the civilian population. This Essay focuses on the no-fly zone facet of the Resolution’s enforcement regime, while also situating the no-fly zone in the context of the overall operations in Libya. Part II provides a description of the legal basis for no-fly zones in general, together with a discussion of historical examples of such operations. As no-fly zones represent a unique form of international coercion, Part III assesses the legal parameters governing their maintenance, particularly those deriving from the law of armed conflict. Part IV concludes with an analysis of the Libyan no-fly zone in order to pull these two normative strands together and to identify Resolution 1973’s unique features.
As will become apparent, the Libyan no-fly zone is unprecedentedly robust. In terms of geographical coverage, scope of the ban, and enforcement authorization, it is much broader than any previous no-fly zone. Moreover, maintaining the zone while conducting other combat operations to protect civilians creates a synergy that renders the military enforcement effort highly potent. But at the same time, it is essential to understand that, notwithstanding its aggressiveness, operations to police the zone are still governed by the law of armed conflict, albeit as applied in light of the Security Council’s authorization. These factors make for an especially complex normative regime. But before turning to the Libyan no-fly zone, it is first necessary to examine the law governing such operations in general.
